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Early investments in regional hydrogen systems carry two distinct types of risk: (1) economic risk that projects will not be financially viable, resulting in stranded capital, and (2) environmental risk that projects will not deliver deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and through leaks, perhaps even contribute to climate change. This article systematically reviews the literature and performs analysis to describe both types of risk in the context of recent efforts in the United States and worldwide to support the development of “hydrogen hubs” or regional systems of hydrogen production and use. We review estimates of hydrogen production costs and projections of how future costs are likely to change over time for different production routes, environmental impacts related to hydrogen and methane leaks, and the availability and effectiveness of carbon capture and sequestration. Finally, we consider system‐wide risks associated with evolving regional industrial structures, including job displacement and underinvestment in shared components, such as refueling. We conclude by suggesting a set of design principles that should be applied in developing early hydrogen hubs if they are to be a successful step toward creating a decarbonized energy system. 

Many studies anticipate that carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) will be essential to decarbonizing the U.S. economy. However, prior work has not estimated the time required to develop, approve, and implement a geologic sequestration site in the United States. We generate such an estimate by identifying six clearance points that must be passed before a sequestration site can become operational. For each clearance point (CP), we elicit expert judgments of the time required in the form of probability distributions and then use stochastic simulation to combine and sum the results. We find that, on average, there is a 90% chance that the time required lies between 5.5 and 9.6 y, with an upper bound of 12 y. Even using the most optimistic expert judgements, the lower bound on time is 2.7 y, and the upper bound is 8.3 y. Using the most pessimistic judgements, the lower bound is 3.5 y and the upper bound is 19.2 y. These estimates suggest that strategies must be found to safely accelerate the process. We conclude the paper by discussing seven potential strategies. 

Climate-induced extreme weather events, as well as other natural and human-caused disasters, have the potential to increase the duration and frequency of large power outages. Resilience, in the form of supplying a small amount of power to homes and communities, can mitigate outage consequences by sustaining critical electricity-dependent services. Public decisions about investing in resilience depend, in part, on how much residential customers value those critical services. Here we develop a method to estimate residential willingness-to-pay for back-up electricity services in the event of a large 10-day blackout during very cold winter weather, and then survey a sample of 483 residential customers across northeast USA using that method. Respondents were willing to pay US$1.7–2.3/kWh to sustain private demands and US$19–29/day to support their communities. Previous experience with long-duration outages and the framing of the cause of the outage (natural or human-caused) did not affect willingness-to-pay.